The Jurisprudence of Article III by Brilmayer, Lea
DECEMBER 1979
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ARTICLE III:
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CONTROVERSY" REQUIREMENT
Lea Brilmayer*
The standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines are frequently
criticized by those who seek greater access to federal courts. In
this Article, Professor Brilmayer examines the theoretical under-
pinnings of the "case or controversy" requirement of article III and
concludes that these justiciability rules are appropriate. They serve
three interrelated policies: the smooth allocation of power among
courts over time; the proper representation of individuals who will
be affected by an adverse judgment; and the interest in self-deter-
mination. Professor Brilmayer proposes that courts explicitly rely
on these policies in deciding justiciability questions.
T HEORETICAL understanding of legal institutions is not
always commensurate with their importance, allowing the
jurisprudential significance of some legal doctrines to escape
unnoticed. An important example is the "case or controversy"
requirement derived from article Ill of the federal Constitu-
tion,' which dictates the manner in which constitutional issues
must arise if they are to be addressed by the federal courts.
The case or controversy requirement, also called the "justici-
ability" doctrine, includes more specialized notions of ripeness,
mootness, and standing to sue, and prohibits consideration of
constitutional issues except as a necessary incident to the res-
olution of a concrete "case" or "controversy."' 2 This doctrine
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to
thank Bill King, Class of r98o, University of Texas Law School, for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;
- to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and
Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States; - between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
2 See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts; when its requirements
are not satisfied courts are without power to proceed, regard-
less of the wishes of the parties. 3 Such restrictions have been
vigorously attacked as unnecessary and unnatural, 4 and the
explanations provided by the Court have not been sufficiently
persuasive to deflect the cynical suggestion that the Court has
manipulated justiciability questions to mask hostility to the
merits of constitutional claims.5 This Article will show that
these doctrines are unified by purposes which have not pre-
viously been well understood. Examination of these purposes
should provide persons interested in constitutional litigation,
either as a means to social change or as a method of preserving
the status quo, with a conceptual basis for procedural framing
of constitutional arguments.
To illustrate what the standing, ripeness, and mootness
doctrines hold, imagine a citizen in a town that has recently
enacted an ordinance prohibiting the posting of campaign signs
on residential property. Assume he believes it is unconstitu-
tional to restrict political expression this way, but has posted
no campaign signs himself and therefore has not been prose-
cuted. In fact, he has no present interest in putting up a
sign. He does, however, resent this ordinance. What can he
do?
First, he might initiate litigation by alleging the ordinance
infringes the first amendment rights of others. His neighbor
would put up signs but for the ordinance. Second, he might
attempt to show that his own future first amendment rights
are threatened. Next year, he may wish to post campaign
signs. The first approach raises standing objections, the sec-
ond, ripeness objections. The standing doctrine holds that one
may not assert the rights of other persons; it is necessary to
allege a "personal stake" in the dispute. 6 If the citizen straight-
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-241 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
3 See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (although lower court
did not address the standing issue, Supreme Court must since it is a question of
subject matter jurisdiction); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (state determi-
nation of justiciability not binding on Supreme Court).
4 See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 1i6 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (x968); Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (4973); Tushnet,
The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
5 See Berch, Unchain the Courts - An Essay on the Role of the Federal Courts
in the Vindication of Social Rights, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. 437.
6 The phrase "personal stake" is taken from Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86, 204 (1962)). See also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (i1975); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (ig6i); Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44 (1943).
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY
forwardly insists his interests are not involved but the rights
of his neighbors are, he will be denied access to federal court,
and most state courts also. 7  If the citizen tries the second
approach - hypothesizing a personal future interest - then
the ripeness requirement must be met. The danger that sup-
posedly motivates him must be real and immediate, rather
than distant and speculative. 8 There must be concrete dem-
onstration that some harm really will occur; it must be based
on objective evidence and not merely his own assertions.9
Otherwise the standing limitation could be subverted by self-
serving hypotheses about future harm.
A related and third limitation is the doctrine of mootness.
Assume our citizen violates the statute and is arrested, but the
city council sees the error of its ways and repeals the ordinance
so that charges are dropped. The citizen wishes to plunge
onward, however, appealing if necessary to the United States
Supreme Court. This would not be permitted, since the case
would be moot. 10 Now that charges have been dropped, the
sole motivation for pursuing the matter must be assertion of
the rights of others, most likely persons faced with similar
statutes. When a litigant falls to meet the ripeness require-
ment, the dubious nature of hypothesized future harm suggests
that it is a pretext for complaining about infringement of the
rights of others; when a claim is moot, the past harm appears
to be a pretext for doing essentially the same thing.
These case or controversy doctrines are viewed dimly by
both layman and the bar." Law students first make their
acquaintance in civil procedure courses, where the doctrines
win prizes for being arcane, technical, and pointless. Lawyers
7 Several states, including Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and North Carolina, allow advisory opinions. HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 2, at 69-70. However, state court determinations of standing are not
binding on the Supreme Court. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
s See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (ig6i) (challenge to anticontraceptive
statute disallowed because it had never been enforced and, the Court thought, would
never be enforced); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (i947) ("A
hypothetical threat is not enough.").
9 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. i, 13-14 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are
not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm . . . "); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (i96i).
10 County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (i979). See generally C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § I2, at 39 (3d ed. 1976)
(no case or controversy remaining once issue is moot).
A number of exceptions to the general prohibition against hearing moot cases are
recognized. For instance, a criminal defendant may be able to challenge his conviction
even after his sentence has been served if the conviction carries with it "collateral
legal consequences." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In addition, a case
may be heard if the issue involved is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See
id.; P. 317 inSra.
11 See note 4 supra.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
face them when framing constitutional challenges, for the
courts seem determined to make life difficult through their
loyalty to technicalities which seem to bear no rational rela-
tionship to anything important. Nonlawyers encounter these
doctrinal mysteries when reading about cases that are inter-
esting for other reasons, 12 and conclude that this is typical
legalistic nonsense. And other legal systems seem to do quite
well without such requirements. 13 Since there seems, at least
at first glance, to be little reason to focus on the procedural
context in which admittedly important constitutional issues are
raised, the courts appear to be either dissembling or hung up
on procedural red tape.
Commonly, two reasons are offered to explain why courts
act this way. The first is textual; it takes as its premise the
wording of article m-f. Article III defines the federal judicial
power in terms of the power to decide certain classes of "cases"
and "controversies"; cases involving federal questions, contro-
versies between citizens of diverse states, and so forth. 14 The
wording has traditionally been understood to include the power
to resolve abstract legal issues, including constitutional issues,
but only as a necessary byproduct of the resolution of partic-
ular disputes between individuals. ' 5 Judicial review of statutes
is thus justified by and limited to decision of "real" cases.
Litigation whose sole justification is the analysis of problems
of constitutional interpretation is not a case or controversy in
this sense.
There are minor historical problems with this analysis.
English practice at the time the Constitution was framed in-
cluded resolution of some abstract disputes; 16 in addition, the
law of declaratory judgments has developed to permit adju-
dication of some disputes that would not then have been
heard.17 The practice at the time the Constitution was written
"E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (i974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)-
13 M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COmPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77
(1979).
14 See note I supra.
's See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Supreme
Court will not decide constitutional issues in the abstract); Tennessee Publishing Co.
v. American Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. i8 (1936) (constitutional issue should not be decided
unless necessary to case).
16 See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
" Compare Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) (declaratory
judgment, which was unknown to either English or American courts at the time the
Constitution was adopted, is beyond the federal judiciary's authority), with Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (i937) (Declaratory Judgment Act of
1934 did not violate article III case or controversy requirement).
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY
was therefore both more restrictive and more lenient than at
present. Courts nonetheless still allude to historical under-
standings, even while admitting that today's understandings
are slightly altered. 18
The main reason why this textual and historical approach
is no longer entirely persuasive, however, is that today many
see constitutional adjudication not justified primarily as a
means to resolve disputes, but as an end in itself, for judicial
review vindicates the rights of the unpopular minorities the
Constitution was designed to protect. 19 Whether one phrases
this rationale in terms of social contract theory20 or interest
group politics, 21 the courts are seen as having primary respon-
sibility to take action when necessary to curb majoritarian
excesses. This rationale has gained acceptance and is currently
considered a cornerstone of constitutional jurisprudence.
22 If
the purpose of constitutional review is restraint of overreaching
majorities, however, there seems to be no reason to insist on
the traditional interpretation of the "case or controversy" word-
ing of article m. Instead, the availability of review should
turn on whether a statute arguably violates the constitutional
rights of minorities and not the procedural posture in which
the issue is presented.
The second common explanation for the contemporary ap-
plication of the case or controversy limitation accepts this
theory of the basis of constitutional adjudication, and goes on
to take a cynical perspective on a perceived unwillingness of
the Burger Court to fulfill this constitutional responsibility.
The charge is that the doctrines are being used as a convenient
opportunity to avoid both implementation of past decisions of
the Warren Court and resolution of new and controversial
social issues.23 Sometimes a similar observation is expressed
more approvingly; Bickel, for instance, applauded what he
saw as legitimate decisions to delay controversial issues until
Is The historical difficulties are conceded in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96
(1968).
'9 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).
20 See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 49-56 (1977).
21 Shapiro, Judicial Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Position, 47 COR-
NELL L.Q. 175 (1962).
22 The growth of the rationale was inspired in part by the famous footnote four
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933
(1973).
23 See Berch, supra note 5. The legitimacy of using the justiciability doctrines to
avoid difficult issues is discussed in Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"
- A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLuM. L. REv.
I (1964).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
they were politically less volatile. 24 If the justiciability doc-
trines have no principled purposes it may be reasonable to
conclude that they mask either political caution or hostility to
the merits of a constitutional claim. The Court's refusal to
acknowledge that caution or hostility motivates the doctrines
is then, quite obviously, dishonest. On the other hand, the
previous inability to articulate a principled explanation does
not mean that no such explanation exists. The hypothesis here
is that a satisfactory theory does exist, and does not depend
on the "case decision" justification for review which many
people today find old-fashioned. While it is possible to deny
that such a theory actually would vindicate what can be char-
acterized as past dishonest avoidance of the merits, even a
cynic should be pleased to have a coherent analysis to which
to hold the Court in the future.
This Article will attempt to provide such an analysis by
discussing three interrelated policies of article III: the smooth
allocation of power among courts over time;25 the unfairness
of holding later litigants to an adverse judgment in which they
may not have been properly represented; 26 and the importance
of placing control over political processes in the hands of the
people most closely involved. 27 These three perspectives will
be referred to as restraint, representation, and self-determi-
nation. None of these themes is new to the case law, but thus
far they have been summarily or conclusorily treated. They
are the key concepts in understanding the proper function of
article III courts.
I. RESTRAINT
When faced with problems of whether particular issues are
properly presented for adjudication, courts frequently allude
to judicial restraint as a reason for hesitation about passing on
the merits. In an early case discussing justiciability the Court
wrote:
[We have] no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of
a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable
with the Constitution, except as [we are] called upon to ad-
judge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In
the exercise of that jurisdiction, [the Court] is bound by two
rules, to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate
a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
24 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
25 See pp. 303-06 infra.
26 See pp. 3o6-io infra.
27 See pP. 310-15 infra.
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY
deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitu-
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.
28
The first of these rules would prohibit adjudication in the first
amendment hypothetical because there is no need to decide
the issue - disallowing litigation would not harm the citizen
plaintiff - and according to this rule the Court should not
resolve the question before such a need arises. The second
principle the Court recited is related to the first because, even
where there is a justiciable case, an overly broad rule does
implicitly what courts are forbidden to do explicitly; namely,
it resolves the legal merits of questions not actually posed and
which therefore need not be decided. These principles contem-
plate an essentially passive judicial role. They are reflected
also in a variety of other doctrines, such as finality of appeal-
able orders2 9 and adequate and independent state grounds.
30
The cited reasoning merely states the traditional idea of
judicial function without justifying it. It remains to be shown
why we should defer resolution of legal issues until they are
raised by the necessity of a concrete case. One explanation
might be that this prevents undue interference with the deci-
sions of other branches of government, whose activities would
otherwise be subject to the constant scrutiny of the courts.
Thus it is sometimes said that judicial review should be held
to a minimum since review is a countermajoritarian institution
in a fundamentally democratic society. Courts should there-
fore defer to the judgments of other branches of government,
which have presumably concluded that their activities satisfy
constitutional standards.
3 '
Clearly, there must be more to judicial restraint than this
reasoning suggests. In the first place, according to the usual
understanding of judicial function, courts are not supposed to
anticipate issues even when no constitutional questions are
involved. When formulating common law principles, they are
28 Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (emphasis added). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503
(196i) ("'The best teaching of this Court's experience admonishes us not to entertain
constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity.") (quoting Parker v.
County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 333 (I949)); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); California v. San Pablo R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
29 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 509-10 (x975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
30 See, e.g., Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327 (1949) (allowing state
to construe state statute); cf. Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979) (discussing standing
and the adequate and independent state ground doctrine).
31 See A. BICKEL, supra note 24.
1979]
HeinOnline -- 93 Harv. L. Rev.  303 1979-1980
SY
l
it i t be applied. 28
ti
iff i l t
t ti i .




i ll i l ted
,




i t t t t i t i t it t i-
s
t










28 Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration,
II . . , ) . l . , . . ,
1 '' i i e
ti l ')
. , 1 49» . , . .
i , i ); li i . l . ., . . ).
29 r ti r . . , . . , - (1 ) ( ist,
30 See, e.g., Parker v. ounty of os ngeles, . . ( )
. . , . t. II i i t i
t te i t t t tri ).
31 See A. BICKEL, supra note 24.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
obliged to limit their discussion to the case at hand. Discussion
of hypothetical situations may be dismissed by later courts as
mere dicta. Moreover, as stated, the principle of "undue in-
terference" begs the question of what interference is "undue."
Where there is a written constitution, some measure of coun-
termajoritarianism is positively desirable. And in seeking to
limit judicial contradiction of majority will, proponents of ju-
dicial restraint are relying upon an irrelevant fact, namely, the
fact that federal judges do not run for office. This fact is
irrelevant because if legislatures seriously fulfill their respon-
sibilities to consider whether their activities are constitutional,
they also risk behaving in a countermajoritarian fashion. Since
refusal to yield to majority preferences when it would lead to
constitutional violations generally frustrates democracy, there
is little significance to the fact that it is appointed rather than
elected officials who decide these constitutional questions. The
only reason for leaving such decisions to legislative judgment
would be if legislatures do not in fact fulfill their counterma-
joritarian responsibilities, and this were thought desirable.
A better explanation of the concept of judicial restraint is
based on the relationships among courts over time. Stare
decisis in effect subordinates the opinions and policy choices
of later courts to those of the present court. Given that opin-
ions about the proper scope of constitutional protections are
bound to differ, and given that a decision settles the matter
for a while at least, it is obviously important who is vested
with the responsibility for making the initial decision and,
thus, at what point the issue is considered ready for deci-
sion. To allow a court to settle any matter it wished to address
would give precedence to the preferences of earlier courts, who
are able to tie the hands of the subsequent ones. There is a
clear need for some mechanism to allocate decisionmaking
responsibility among successive courts, by specifying the point
at which an issue may be addressed.
Comparison of legislative and judicial systems of authority
demonstrates the special accommodation between continuity
and change which results from the theory of precedent. A
legislative decision does not legally bind the actions of future
legislatures: power is divided equally since any group can
rescind the actions of its predecessors. Continuity is possible
because the process of applying decisions does not give rise to
opportunities for reexamination of the wisdom of the decision;
legislatures do not implement their own decisions, and the
courts and executives who do apply these decisions have lim-
ited rights to question the standards they apply. Courts assure
[Vol. 93:297
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY
continuity in the same way, by binding the institutions charged
with applying legal standards; but those charged with applying
the standards are other courts operating under the doctrine of
stare decisis.
The common law method maintains this process by assign-
ing to each court only the legal issues that arise during that
court's term. Allowing issues to be resolved at a faster rate
would have one of two undesirable results: inflexibility from
overcommitment to outmoded standards (as the average, age
of the precedent increased) or an erosion of the stare decisis
doctrine through a high rate of overruling. While a high rate
of default through overruling would counteract the faster rate
of establishment of legal principles, it would be costly, for
failure to honor past commitments undermines the ability to
make new ones.
This problem is particularly troublesome if judicial review
of legislation is viewed as a tool of social engineering, for stare
decisis is essential if courts are to have a maximum impact in
achieving social reforms. Since the resolution of a single case
does little to advance far-reaching goals such as racial integra-
tion, the Supreme Court must be able to alter the incentive
structure of other individuals it hopes to influence if it is to
induce compliance with constitutional rulings. To do so, the
Court must clearly and credibly state the legal repercussions
of disobedience. This means that in order to implement social
programs - particularly ambitious ones where voluntary com-
pliance is least likely - the Court must be able to commit the
lower courts and later Supreme Courts to a course of action.
Otherwise, recalcitrant individuals will evade the ruling in the
hope that by the time they are brought into court, the law will
have changed. Even if the reform movement is not dissipated
by a change in the law, it is still slowed since every case must
be individually enforced.
Anything that serves to weaken the force of precedent thus
threatens both judicial power generally and the power to im-
plement constitutional norms specifically. Even those who
would allow courts to decide legal issues in the abstract would
have to admit the necessity of stare decisis; in fact, the very
concept of abstract resolution of a legal issue depends on a
theory of precedent. What would be the point of resolving the
first amendment claim in our hypothetical example, if not to
settle the constitutionality of this or similar statutes for the
future? Indeed it is precisely when the concerned citizen has
no personal stake that his motivation in litigating the consti-
tutional issue is most dependent upon the vitality of the doc-
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trine of stare decisis. Yet procedural innovation to allow liti-
gation of abstract issues undermines the very institution upon
which reform movements rely.
II. REPRESENTATION
A second philosophical perspective on the case or contro-
versy requirement has to do with due process. It focuses on
the fairness problems that would arise if an ideological chal-
lenger - a challenger without the traditional personal stake -
were permitted to litigate a constitutional claim. This per-
spective will be referred to as the "representation" perspective
in order to highlight the similarities between justiciability doc-
trine and the requirement, in class action litigation, that the
named plaintiff be a member of the class he seeks to represent.
Recall the first amendment hypothetical given at the outset
of the discussion. It is unlikely that the concerned citizen in
that case would admit at the start of the litigation, "this is a
statute which never hurt anybody and never will." Rather, he
will argue that some as yet unidentified persons will desire to
post campaign signs but will be stopped from doing so by the
ordinance in question. He will support his ideological argu-
ments by reference to the tangible interests of such persons.
The due process problems that would be created if the
concerned citizen were permitted to raise such constitutional
claims can be illustrated by comparison to the fairness ques-
tions that arise in the class action context as a result of the
application of res judicata theory. Under the theory of res
judicata, resolution of combined law/fact disputes are binding
in a later suit between the same parties. In a typical case, the
operation of this rule is unremarkable. It does not seem unfair
to say, for example, that if Jones sues Acme Appliances for
selling him a defective refrigerator and loses, he is foreclosed
from suing later on the same set of facts. However, res ju-
dicata has a more extensive impact in class action litigation:
in certain narrowly defined circumstances, a litigant may be
bound by a judgment obtained by someone else. 32 If Acme
sold one hundred refrigerators all defective in exactly the same
way, one purchaser might be able to sue on behalf of himself
and the other ninety-nine. Everyone will be bound by the
decision, whether it results in a judgment for Acme or for the
class of purchasers.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the due process clause
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) establishes the requirements that class actions must
satisfy to be given effect as res judicata.
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY
of the Constitution as imposing limits on the extent to which
a person may be bound by the res judicata effect of a class
action. In particular, the class that will be bound must in
most circumstances be narrowly defined to include only those
individuals who are similarly situated to the class represen-
tative who brought the suit. There are other procedural safe-
guards that must be followed if the judgment is to be bind-
ing. In many situations, absent class members must be
notified of the litigation and given a chance to "opt out" or
participate; 33 also, the class representative cannot assert the
rights of absent members with whom there is a potential con-
flict of interest.34 It is considered unfair and unconstitutional
to greet litigant Smith, the purchaser of a defective Acme
refrigerator, with the news that his rights have already been
determined in some prior litigation between Acme and Jones,
an individual he has never heard of.
If any concerned citizen who wished to were permitted to
litigate constitutional issues, res judicata would ordinarily not
be a problem for anyone but the citizen himself. Thus, the
position of the ideological challenger is not precisely compa-
rable to that of a class representative. However, stare decisis,
a doctrine that is related to res judicata, would come into
play. In general, of course, the impact of stare decisis is less
dramatic than that of res judicata. It is not quite as serious
to tell Smith that a ten-year-old precedent resolves the deter-
minative legal issue. Since the factual determinations from
that case would not be binding, Smith could try to show that
the facts - and therefore the legal issues - of that precedent
are somewhat different, and therefore not controlling. A de-
vice somewhat akin to the "similarity of circumstances" re-
quirement in class actions is at work. If Smith is in a different
position from the earlier plaintiff, he can distinguish that case
and attempt to reargue the legal merits. If he cannot do this,
however, because the situations are "indistinguishable," he will
be bound. In fact, in at least one context, federal courts have
recognized that the impact of stare decisis may necessitate
special protection in much the same way as res judicata.
35
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2)(A) provides procedures for class members to exclude
themselves from the class. These procedures apply only to rule 23(b)(3) class actions,
however.
34 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)
(3).
35 In Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d i6 (5th Cir. 1970),
intervention as of right under rule 24(a) was permitted because the intervenor had a
substantial interest in litigation interpreting a federal statute; the court allowed inter-
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Because stare decisis, like res judicata, may have a binding
effect, we should be reluctant to permit the concerned citizen
to assert the legal rights of his neighbor who perhaps would
like to post campaign signs. We need to protect the neighbor's
present and future interests; we do not want the concerned
citizen to litigate abstract principles of constitutional law when
the precedent established will govern someone else's first
amendment rights. Similarly, even if the concerned citizen has
his own claim, we should insist that he state it with specificity
so that no overly broad precedent will threaten the rights of
persons in different positions.
The binding effect of stare decisis might not be an obstacle
to suits by ideological challengers if procedural safeguards
could be devised to protect the rights of absent third parties.
There are at least three possibilities: extending opportunities
to "opt out," denying an adverse ruling any precedential effect,
or defining representative capacity according to criteria other
than similarity of interest. In fact, however, none of these
safeguards are workable. Opt-out provisions are not likely to
provide much protection when it is stare decisis rather than
res judicata that will bind absent parties. One difficulty is
whether presumptively to include or presumptively to exclude
the affected individuals. It seems unfair to include everyone
who does not specifically request to be excluded; the class of
all present and future persons whose rights may be implicated
is so ill-defined and scattered that no effective notice of the
pending litigation can be given. If notice cannot be given, can
it be fair to place the burden of determining the existence of
litigation on the absent class members? They may not even
be born yet. For similar reasons, it would be unworkable
presumptively to exclude all persons who do not choose to
participate. Aside from the fact that there is no particular
reason why they should prefer to be included - it is unlikely
that we would deny them the right to cite a precedent in their
favor if the suit were successful - there are, again, severe
pragmatic problems of notification.
36
vention as a means of special protection, recognizing that the stare decisis impact of
the litigation might impair the applicant's ability to protect his interests. Rule 24(a)
provides that applicants may intervene as of right when "disposition of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede [the applicant's] ability to protect [his] interest."
See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The Atlantis approach has been followed in other, analogous circumstances. See
Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (gth Cir. 1977); Air Lines Stewards Local 55o v.
American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d ioi (7th Cir. 1972); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
,75 (D.C. Cir. I969); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 5o F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Miss. 2970),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 F.2d 13oo (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1019 (1972).
36 If, as we might suspect, later litigants were allowed to take advantage of a
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Denying an adverse ruling any legal effect would be the
approach most protective of third party rights. While it seems
on the one hand unreasonable to give the ruling a binding
effect only if it is favorable, this approach would to some
extent be consistent with the curtailment of the mutuality
requirement for collateral estoppel.3 7 Still, serious problems
remain. One is whether a later court can really be expected
to ignore the reasoning in the prior case. Once a competent
court canvasses the case authority and analyzes the parties'
arguments, the result may still be viewed as influential. In
addition, this approach leaves unsolved the present problem
of providing a workable definition of a traditional case or
controversy. Presumably, this distinction would still have to
be made. Although a traditional case would bind subsequent
traditional and ideological litigation, an ideological case would
only bind subsequent ideological litigation. Thus, to determine
whether the resolution of a prior dispute determines the out-
come in a new dispute, we would have to know whether
traditional cases with traditional plaintiffs were involved.
Despite its problems, that approach might still be prefer-
able to the third alternative: giving the precedent its usual
effect but substituting other criteria of representative adequacy
for the traditional "similarity of circumstances" one. We might
assume, for instance, that any well-established and well-fi-
nanced public interest group with enough concern to initiate
litigation should be allowed to assert the public interest as a
private "attorney general." But there are reasons to doubt
whether self-appointed ideological plaintiffs should be pre-
sumed to be adequate representatives.
Isn't a traditional plaintiff better able vividly to illustrate
the adverse effects of the complained-of activity? 38 Isn't there
a danger that by seeking to change the law too rapidly an
ideological plaintiff will take greater risks by framing the issues
in a broader, more controversial, manner? 39 Public interest
lawyers acknowledge that these dangers exist even in tradi-
precedent even though they did not "opt in," the presumptive exclusion of absent
third parties would be the practical equivalent of the second proposed procedural
safeguard, since it would effectively deny an adverse ruling any precedential impact.
37 See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942). For a list of the jurisdictions that have abandoned the mutuality
requirement, see 5o C.J.S. Judgments § 765 (i947 & Supp. 1979).
38 See Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability, and the Limits of the Common
Law Method, 57 B.U.L. REv. 807, 827 (1977).
39 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 (1972). The club
deliberately omitted from its complaint any allegation that its members had been
injured in fact, and thus it rejected the traditional indicia of standing. One suspects
that its arguments would have been heard more sympathetically if it had adopted a
less radical stance. See also Brilmayer, supra note 38, at 820 & n.62.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
tional litigation.4" Yet so long as they represent individual
clients to whom an ethical duty is owed, their risk remains
within ethical limits. 41 The danger is that without a real
client, and without a sense of accountability to an identifiable
individual, their capacity truly to represent the public interest
would be diminished.
In fact, one of the best explanations of the case or contro-
versy requirement may be the desire of courts to ensure the
accountability of representatives. One reason, we said, for
allowing courts to review legislation is that minority groups
and unpopular points of view may not be adequately repre-
sented in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. 42 The
case or controversy requirement guarantees that the individu-
als most affected by the challenged activity will have a role in
the challenge. This guarantee should be seen as a minimal
element of the legitimacy of a legal system which imposes legal
burdens upon its members. At some point in the legal process
the affected individuals should have their day in court.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION
The "minority viewpoint" justification also bears on the
third perspective on the case or controversy requirement: the
self-determination perspective. This third approach argues
that persons should not be able to assert the rights of others
even assuming they are good representatives, that is, likely to
prevail on the merits. This third line of reasoning shows that
the justiciability requirements serve as procedural safeguards
for the important liberal value of self-determination. It is
frequently argued that the community should not interfere with
individual personal choices which do not harm anyone else.
Legal issues such as regulation of private sexual conduct, drug
use, and abortion are often discussed in these terms. The
values implicit in such an attitude include individualism; dis-
taste for governmental paternalism and the moral evangelism
of our neighbors (whether based on religion, artistic taste, or
exuberance for jogging); and mutual respect or at least toler-
40 Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness
in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REV. 337 (1978). See also Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1975).
41 See, e.g., Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty, 82 YALE L.J. ixii
(1973) (loyalty to client causes lawyers to raise all possible arguments, despite the risk
that they will impede broad litigation goals). For a discussion of some ways in which
the traditional attorney-client privilege is altered in public law litigation, see J. HAN-
DLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 31-33 (1978). See generally B.
WEISBROD, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (1978).
42 See p. 301 supra.
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ance for one another's choices. A contrasting cluster of values
emphasizes a more intimate relationship between the individ-
ual and the community; social or political bodies are seen as
having interests or obligations in their own right; for instance
they may inquire into the internal well-being of citizens, assess
their sickness or health, and take action. Although there are
clearly elements of this latter view in American jurisprudence,
it is probably the predominant view that if an activity really
threatens no one but the actor then the community should not
interfere coercively. So often do debates form themselves
around the empirical question of the existence of harm to
others that it seems that many people perceive this to be where
the important issue lies.
This concept of "self-regarding acts" has an important place
in substantive constitutional law. Privacy related arguments,
in particular, are easily derivable from such a premise. 43 So
are first amendment protections for speech that annoys, angers,
or disgusts, but does not actually hurt anyone. 44 One author
in fact attempts to use this principle as a foundation for con-
stitutional rights generally, distinguishing between "personal"
preferences about one's own enjoyment of goods or opportun-
ities, and "external" preferences about the assignment of goods
and opportunities to others. 45 Of course, it is likely to be
difficult to disentangle these different sorts of preferences in
some cases. It may be that I have such a strong moral distaste
for someone else's conduct that the thought that such conduct
is allowed actually upsets me physically. The fact of harm is
sometimes therefore not enough; the harm resulting from
overly acute moral sensitivity may not be morally cognizable.
The doctrine of "standing to sue" also reflects the ideal of
self-determination. It holds that litigation may only be initi-
ated by an individual with a "personal stake" in the dispute
46 -
that is, by someone with personal and not merely external pref-
erences about the outcome. Moreover, in making decisions
about standing to sue the courts have discerned two distinct
issues. The first, "injury in fact,"' 47 corresponds to the prob-
43 For example, the argument in favor of permitting contraception is based pri-
marily on the notion that the use of contraceptive devices does not affect anyone but
the users.
44 Obscene materials might be protected under this theory, since reading pornog-
raphy arguably does not affect anyone else's interests.
4s R. DWOmN, supra note ig. See also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (i969). But see P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1968).
46 See cases cited note 6 supra.
47 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 15o, 152 (1970) (standing under case or controversy standard requires injury in
fact and violation of legal right).
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lem of whether some complained-of private activity actually
hurts others. The second is whether that injury is legally
cognizable; 48 it corresponds to the problem of whether an
admittedly real impact upon others is an interest the legal
system protects or merely a harm one is expected to bear.
The close relationship between the standing doctrine and
the liberal ideal of self-definition can be illustrated by two
recent cases. In Gilmore v. Utah,4 9 the mother of a convicted
murderer sought to appeal her son's death sentence to the
United States Supreme Court. The son declined to appeal,
although he had a colorable claim that the statute under which
he had been sentenced was unconstitutional due to the eighth
amendment. The standing objection was raised by the son's
attorneys. Although the majority did not refer to this issue,
Chief Justice Burger, who concurred, wrote, "[T]his Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to article III of the Constitution only
over 'cases and controversies."' 5 0 Justice Marshall, dissenting,
argued that "the Eighth Amendment not only protects the
rights of individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual
punishment, but. . . also expresses a fundamental interest of
society in ensuring that state authority is not used to administer
barbaric punishments."'5
It may be that Justice Marshall is correct and that we
should recognize such a societal interest. If so, the standing
doctrine would have to fall.5 2 Such a right would undermine
48 See, e.g., id. at 152-53; Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1969); cf.
Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968) (respondent, member of class
protected by statute, has standing to sue); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 3o6
U.S. 1i8, 137-38 (1939) (suit to restrain execution of an unconstitutional statute
permitted only to protect legal rights).
49 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). It is instructive to compare Gilmore with Rosenberg v.
United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953), in which an interested "next friend" sought to
present legal arguments against the Rosenbergs' execution that their counsel had
declined to raise. The Rosenbergs dropped their objection and the argument was
heard; the challenge was rejected on the merits. In a concurring opinion Justice
Jackson objected to the irregular manner in which the issue was raised:
Every lawyer familiar with the workings of our criminal courts and the
habits of our bar will agree that this precedent presents a threat to orderly and
responsible representation of accused persons and the right of themselves and
their counsel to control their own cases. The lower court refused to accept
Edelman's intrusion but by the order in question must accept him as having
standing to take part in, or to take over, the Rosenbergs' case. That such
disorderly intervention is more likely to prejudice rather than to help the
representation of accused persons in highly publicized cases is self-evident. We
discountenance this practice.
Id. at 292.
50 429 U.S. at ioi6.
-" Id. at oig.
S2 One might make an analogy to corporation law and to an intuitive sense that
shareholders should have a right to prevent the corporation from engaging in illegal
[Vol. 93:297
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the prohibition against regulating self-regarding acts; this pro-
hibition rests in part on the assumption that societal interest
is really the sum total of personal interests of individuals, and
not some ghostly entity. The idea of community interest apart
from the needs of particular people suggests it may be neces-
sary to pressure people into changing life plans and opinions
for the good of some undefinable, elusive common good.
5 3
The second case involved Reverend Moon's Unification
Church.5 4 Tamara Schuppin's parents brought suit in federal
court against that organization when they could not convince
their daughter to leave the Moonies and return home. Of the
twelve counts, all but two involved allegations of wrongs to
Tamara herself, for which the parents sought remedies on her
behalf; the remainder dealt with Moon's purported alienation
of Tamara's affection, which previously, they alleged, had
been directed toward the parents. Tamara was of age and
had not been adjudged incompetent. The only evidence sug-
gesting incompetence was the opinion of a psychiatrist who
had never seen her but had previously diagnosed other mem-
bers of the Unification Church. Citing Gilmore, the district
court dismissed eight of the counts filed on Tamara's behalf
but against her wishes because of the parents' lack of standing.
The significance of these cases is not the suggestion that
letting Tamara Schuppin stay with the Moonies and letting
Gary Gilmore die were easy or obvious answers.5 5  Rather,
these cases illustrate how indistinguishable the factors involved
in standing are from the issue of paternalism. If I have a
personal interest in the dispute, a tangible stake, then I seem
to have both a moral and a legal right to involve myself. It
does not count as sufficient reason for either legal or moral
action that I believe the action will help some person who does
not want the "benefit."
5 6
acts, even if the acts actually benefit the corporation. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5823, 5948 (1974).
53 For a discussion of the relationship between liberal values such as free speech
and the idea that "society" is not entitled to prefer certain lifestyles over others, see
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
54 Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 573 F.2d
1295 (2d Cir. 1977).
ss These courts may have been mistaken, for instance, in their findings of com-
petence. Competence is often a troubling point for arguments about paternalism; at
some point lack of wisdom shades into incapacity due to idiocy, infancy, or lunacy;
intervention against the will of the ward then becomes justifiable, if not indeed
necessary.
56 It is true that in some cases a court decision invalidating a statute will not
"force" anyone to take any "benefit" he does not want. Unlike Gilmore and Schuppin,
the neighbor in the first amendment hypothetical remains free not to post signs. It
still seems inappropriate, however, to allow the concerned citizen to define the neigh-
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These are unusual cases, and not just because of the un-
usual preferences of the third parties involved. They are also
unusual because it is rare, in cases where standing is denied,
to have such complete information about the preferences of
the person who would purportedly benefit. Of course, in cases
where standing is not an issue because a traditional plaintiff
is involved, there is also evidence concerning the wishes of
members of the affected group; at least one group member,
the plaintiff, desires litigation. On the other hand, in ideolog-
ically motivated litigation, there may be no indication what-
soever of the wishes of the affected group. Thus advocates of
procedural reform could point out that it takes only one group
member to file a traditional suit, and that it would be unrea-
sonable to assume that all members of the affected group are
hostile to initiation of litigation.
It probably would be unreasonable to make this assump-
tion; but that is not what the standing doctrine does. It merely
places the burden of proof on this issue on the would-be
representative. Certainly he is in a better position than the
defendant to demonstrate whether there is at least one willing
beneficiary; surely the defendant cannot be expected to prove
that no such person exists. The very leniency of requiring
only one aggrieved party whose interests may count as a reason
for action makes it necessary to allocate the burden of proof
this way.
The procedural case or controversy requirement is, there-
fore, an epistemological device. To abandon the case or con-
troversy doctrines would be, in effect, to say that it is not
important to find out who is personally affected and what their
wishes are. In the first amendment hypothetical, the doctrines
mean that the citizen cannot initiate litigation on his neighbor's
behalf without his neighbor's cooperation. He cannot, more
generally, assert the first amendment rights of the world at
large without the cooperation of at least one member of the
affected group. We do not have to be so extreme as the
philosopher who would prevent the government from taking
any external preferences into account.57 But actions on behalf
of other persons should be prohibited when those persons do
not welcome the purported benefits; i.e., coercing people "in
their own best interests." The ideal role for persons with
bor's "best interests" and assert them in court. One author, who apparently recognizes
that there is a relationship between the existence of a community interest and relax-
ation of the standing requirement, nevertheless concludes that communal values war-
rant procedural reform. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). He does not discuss
the effect of this conservative ideology on substantive constitutional norms.
57 See Dworkin, supra note 53.
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ideological interests is then to seek out, inform, and support
litigants whose rights are immediately at stake.
IV. APPLICATIONS
We would be unlikely, in practice, to encounter so easy a
case as the hypothetical illustration at the outset of this pa-
per. No one would be likely to attempt litigation so clearly in
violation of existing procedural requirements. For the same
reason, existing precedents do not deal with such simple prob-
lems. Since both the case law we would like to explain and
the new problems we will have to solve are bound to be far
more complex, it is appropriate to ask how the reasons just
given for the article ImI case or controversy doctrine would
influence our treatment of borderline situations. The discus-
sion below applies these perspectives to identify five consid-
erations that, if present, militate in favor of review in cases
where the plaintiff's personal stake is problematic.
Two preliminary remarks are appropriate. First, it will be
apparent that the approach used to identify these considera-
tions is quite flexible. Rather than attempting a rigid definition
of the phrase "case or controversy," it looks behind the con-
stitutional language to ask whether the purposes served by the
justiciability doctrine allow or prohibit litigation. Second, the
considerations that will be discussed are not novel, although
they are derived from an analysis that is, in some respects,
unlike the reasoning found in the case law. Indeed, one of the
strengths of the perspectives outlined above is that they lead
to basically the traditional sorts of reasoning and results. It
is therefore possible to argue that these perspectives do in fact
capture intuitive notions of justiciability and judicial func-
tion. Moreover, adoption of such perspectives does not involve
a radical departure from existing precedents.
A. The Issue Would Not Otherwise Be Litigated
The first consideration is whether the legal issue posed by
the dispute might be resolved later in another dispute. Each
of the three perspectives indicate that this is a relevant ques-
tion. The restraint perspective suggests that courts should be
least hesitant to adjudicate issues which will not otherwise
arise, since they will not thereby encroach on the prerogatives
of later courts. The desire to ensure adequate representation
is not implicated, because there is no danger of prejudicing the
rights of absent parties in later suits which, by hypothesis, will
not occur. For similar reasons, the self-determination problem
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
does not arise. Presumably, there are no persons better situ-
ated to make the claim, whose arguments are being advanced
without their consent.
Examination of some doctrinal developments shows how
the fact that an issue will not otherwise be litigated influences
the courts. Under a mootness exception for issues that are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review," 58 a technically
moot challenge to an abortion statute has been allowed because
such a case could never reach the Supreme Court during the
pregnancy.5 9 Another example is the leniency of the ripeness
doctrine when easily chilled first amendment rights are at
stake. The reasoning is that if an early challenge is not al-
lowed, individuals will forego their rights and the constitu-
tionality of the law will never be litigated.
60
B. The Litigation Would Not Establish a Precedent
This consideration is also suggested by all three perspec-
tives: if no precedent is established, then later courts' prerog-
atives are not violated and third parties' rights to representa-
tion and'self-determination are less in jeopardy. Two cases in
which the Solicitor General confessed error on appeal suggest
that the courts will consider whether precedent will be estab-
lished. The question in both cases was whether the court
should proceed even though the newly produced agreement
between the parties put an end to the controversy. In Young
v. United States61 an agreement on the issue of law was not
accepted because the judgment would be precedent, "and the
proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely
to the stipulation of the parties." 62 In Casey v. United States
the court accepted a confession that there had been an unrea-
sonable search and seizure because to do so "in this case
. . . would not involve the establishment of any
precedent."' 63 Similarly, courts are willing to proceed in other
'types of litigation in which the parties are not truly adverse
58 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400 (I975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 333 n.2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 8x6 (1969); South Pac. Terminal
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1g9x), quoted in Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. IO3, iio n.ii (i975).
59 Roe v. Wade, 41o U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973).
60 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (allowing overbreadth
challenge). See also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 6ii (1972); Cramp v. Orange
County, 368 U.S. 278 (I96i).
61 315 U.S. 257 (1942).
62 id. at 259.
63 343 U.S. 808 (1952).
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- such as litigation involving consent decrees - in part be-
cause no precedent will be established. 4
C. Constitutional Rights Will Be No Less Jeopardized If
Adjudication Is Disallowed Than If The Issue Is Litigated
And Lost On The Merits
This consideration is most relevant from a representation
perspective: protection of the rights of absent third parties does
not warrant disallowing litigation when that result has the
same effect as a loss on the merits. A classic example of such
a case is NAACP v. Alabama,65 in which a political organi-
zation sought to protect its members by keeping its member-
ship list secret. Since forcing the members to assert their own
rights would have resulted in the same loss of rights as if the
organization had litigated and lost - in fact, the issue might
have been considered moot with regard to any plaintiff who
appeared - the Court allowed the organization to litigate the
free association issue.
D. The Individuals Possessing the Right Cannot Assert It
Themselves
In challenges to statutes regulating relationships between
individuals it sometimes happens that the threat to one per-
son's right stems from coercion of another person. One thinks
of laws that prohibit the issuance of contraceptives; such stat-
utes infringe the patient's rights by regulating the doctor.
6 6
Covenants against the sale of a particular piece of property to
minority group members have a similar effect; these agree-
ments violate the buyer's rights by coercing the seller. 67 The
self-determination perspective suggests that we ordinarily pre-
fer persons to assert their own rights. This preference should
not be considered determinative, however, in situations like
these; for example, either the doctor or the patient should be
permitted to sue.
E. The Would-Be Litigant Has Evidence Of Representative
Capacity Other Than Membership In The Affected Group
In some cases, it may be possible to establish representative
capacity with evidence other than present membership in the
64 See, e.g., Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
6s 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (,972) (distinguishing Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44 (1943)).
67 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (I953).
1979]






ti t t tion
ti
t t . i ll i liti ti t t lt t
a a,65 l
ti t t r t t it r i it r-
. rs
ri t l r lt i t l i t i t
ti t
iff
i ti i .
i als sing t t








t i t i ti e, , i it ti li
l ,
t t tive
ity s ip t
i
64 See, e.g., Tutun v. nited States, 270 . . ( ).
65 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distinguishing Tileston v. Ullman,
. . ( ».
67 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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affected group. For example, the representation arguments
against allowing ideological challenges apply less forcefully
when the would-be plaintiff was once but is no longer a class
member. 68 The danger to be avoided is that presented by the
self-appointed plaintiff whose sole claim to representative ca-
pacity is the fact that he thinks a statute is unconstitutional
because it violates someone else's rights.
V. AN EXAMPLE
The above discussion suggested that the courts have been
relying on these considerations all along, at least implicitly.
A more extensive examination of a particular area of case law
illustrates this point. The example is organizational standing,
for which the predominant concern is the last one men-
tioned - alternative evidence of representative capacity.
It has long been established that a voluntary trade organ-
ization has standing to assert those interests of its members
that are related to the trade activities for which the organi-
zation was formed. 69 A club or social organization has com-
parable rights to sue. 70 In light of the stakeholders' voluntary
membership in the organization, their right to withdraw, and
the organization's accountability to them, it is safe to presume
representative capacity. The Supreme Court recently sum-
marized and reaffirmed the standing of trade organizations in
dicta in the case of Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Commission,71 stating the following criteria:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when:
a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right;
b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and
c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, re-
quires the participation of individual members in the law-
suit.72
Washington Apple did not itself involve a voluntary trade
organization; the criteria just cited were applied, by analogy,
68 See Babbit v. United Farm Workers, 99 S. Ct. 2301 (1979) (right of United
Farm Workers to represent Arizona farm workers in challenge to Arizona union
election law).
69 See National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963)
(per curiam); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
70 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
71 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
72
1 Id. at 343.
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to a governmental commission that the state of Washington
had created and that all apple growers were compelled to
support. The Commission, composed of thirteen elected rep-
resentatives of the apple industry, devotes itself to the pro-
motion of apples through advertising and scientific and market
research; it does not itself grow or market apples. Thus when
the Commission sought to challenge the constitutionality of a
North Carolina statute regulating the packaging of apples, it
was met with the argument that it lacked the "personal stake"
necessary to standing, having only an abstract concern with
the well-being of the apple industry. Defendants also argued
that no disability prevented the growers and dealers from
coming forward to assert their own rights. Cases involving
voluntary trade organizations were said to be inapplicable
since the Commission was not a trade organization and had
no "members" at all.
A unanimous Court sensibly rejected these arguments. The
Commission was, the Court said, the functional equivalent of
a voluntary trade organization. While the growers were not
"members" themselves, they elected all of the Commission's
members. Additionally, the growers financed the organization;
"in a very real sense, therefore, the Commission represents the
State's growers and dealers and provides the means by which
they express their collective views and protect their collective
interests."' 73 The Court also noted that harm to the Washing-
ton apple industry might reduce the assessments supporting
the Commission's activities. "We therefore agree with the Dis-
trict Court," wrote the Chief Justice, "that the Commission
has standing to bring this action in a representational capac-
ity." 74 In the clearest possible sense, the Commission was not
a self-appointed representative.
To be contrasted with Washington Apple is a recent district
court case, Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 75 in which
standing was denied. The plaintiff, a Nader group, sought to
challenge Food and Drug Administration regulations allowing
certain drugs to be marketed, arguing that its "supporters"
would be subjected to economic and health risks. Judge Sirica
denied the plaintiff standing to raise the challenge. Washing-
ton Apple was said to suggest that there must be a substantial
nexus between the organization and the parties it purported to
represent, when the parties were not actual members. The
plaintiff, it was pointed out, had no formal continuing rela-
73 Id. at 345.
74 Id.
7S 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C. 1979)-
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tionship with its small contributors and its undefined "sup-
porters"; moreover, these supporters had no control over the
organization, Nader, or the board of directors he appointed.
Having structured them as nonmembership organizations
for the express purpose of 'promoting efficiency' and minimiz-
ing the 'expense and other burdens' of membership groups,
Mr. Nader would hardly be in a position to seriously argue
that his contributors or supporters exercise any substantial
degree of even indirect control over his organizations. 76
The court also noted that no effective control was possible
where the funds for Health Research Group were channeled
first through an umbrella organization. 77 Thus, at least in the
area of organizational standing to sue, the courts are on the
verge of an avowedly representational approach. It is to be
hoped that they will bring this line of reasoning out into the
open.
VI. CONCLUSION
It should be clear by now that the typical "liberal" and
"conservative" reactions to the justiciability requirements are
shortsighted. Liberals usually argue for greater access to fed-
eral courts; conservatives frequently assert that access should
be limited. But it is coincidental that at this point in history
it is liberal challenges to legislation that are being disal-
lowed. The Constitution has its conservative aspects also, and
at other points in history it has been the conservatives who
have sought access to the courts. 78 The traditional liberal
party line is sensible only when the action the court would
take is more "liberal" than the legislation under attack, and
also more "liberal" than the decision a later court would make
if consideration of the issues was postponed.
In fact, attempts to bring about increased social reform in
courts through abandonment of justiciability limitations are
counterproductive in the long run. Anyone wishing to use
courts as a tool for social engineering should favor steps that
76 1d. at 27.
77 Id. at 28.
78 Contemporary observers might characterize the era of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (sgo5), in this manner. Current litigation over affirmative action programs
- litigation that is also subject to attack on justiciability grounds - suggests that we
will be seeing more "conservative" test cases in the future. See also NCAA v.
Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D. Kan.) (challenge to HEW regulation implementing
Title IX dismissed for want of standing since college athletic association was not a
representative chosen by the colleges), appeal docketed, No. 78-1632 (ioth Cir. Apr.
24, 2978).
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increase court power; threatening the institution of stare decisis
has the opposite effect. Anyone who wishes to protect the
rights of underrepresented third parties should be attempting
to involve those persons in the judicial process, in order to
ensure representation and self-determination.
It is ironic that, in attempting to gear up the judicial
machinery to correct legislative excesses, reformers would at-
tempt to replicate some of the worst aspects of legislative
government. One of the features which most differentiates
judicial from legislative decisionmaking, and makes it more
sensitive to those who will be affected by the decision, is the
fact that courts respond to requests of individuals whose per-
sonal rights are at stake. Surely it would be desirable to
increase the involvement of affected groups in the legislative
process. It is not that our judicial system is so perfectly just
and sensitive, but rather that abandonment of these procedural
limitations seems guaranteed to make things worse. I suspect
that these limitations have evolved in accordance with a set
of unarticulated assumptions roughly congruent with those out-
lined in this paper. The implicit premises of article III should
be explicitly developed as a tool of constitutional jurispru-
dence.
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